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APPEALING A REJECTION AT THE PATENT BOARD OF APPEALS: 
ANALYSIS OF RECENT BOARD DECISIONS AND NON-APPEAL ALTERNATIVES
BY: SUSAN PERNG PAN*
ABSTRACT
This article discusses the merits of appealing rejections to the Board of Patent Appeals in 
comparison to continued ex parte prosecution before the Examiner.  The analysis takes into 
account recent decisions rendered by several patent panels and recent precedent of the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  Recommendations are offered to place claims in better 
condition for appeal and for the types of arguments to be made, as well as to guard against 
potential pitfalls during prosecution.
I. TIMING FOR APPEAL
{1} The timelines for Appeal and ex parte prosecution become intertwined, because the U.S. 
patent statute permits appeal of a rejection in the following circumstances: “[a]n applicant for 
a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the 
primary examiner to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, having once paid the fee for 
such appeal.”1
{2} In implementing the statute, the patent office regulations permit an Applicant to appeal a 
rejection in an application for original patent after receiving either a final rejection or two non-
final rejections.2  It is not necessary that all claims be twice rejected, and it is sufficient to confer 
jurisdiction on the Board if any claim in the application satisfies this requirement.3  It is also not 
necessary that the rejection occur during prosecution of a single application.  It is sufficient if 
one claim is rejected both in a prior application and in a continuing application.4
{3} The patent regulations thus permit Applicants the opportunity to obtain a final disposition of 
the patentability of their patent claims by appealing the Examiner’s rejections prior to reaching 
a “final” impasse with the Examiner.  Because an Applicant has the choice to continue ex parte 
prosecution or pursue the appeal route, the decision should take into account the strength of the 
claims and arguments in view of the cited art and whether the claims are in their best possible 
form prior to entering the appeal process.
II. TO AMEND OR TO APPEAL: THE FESTO FACTOR
{4} Given the options of (1) appealing a final rejection or a second non-final rejection, or (2) 
pursuing prosecution on the merits by the filing of an amendment or response, an Applicant 
would be well-advised to press matters for patentability of the originally-filed claims as far as 
possible before the Examiner.  The 2002 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Festo 
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.5 emphasizes the importance of appealing a 
rejection that an Applicant views as patently incorrect as opposed to amending the claims in 
a response to an office action.6  “While the patentee has the right to appeal, his decision to 
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forgo an appeal and submit an amended claim is taken as a concession that the invention as 
patented does not reach as far as the original claim.”7  When a claim is amended and narrowed, 
whether for the purpose of complying with a prior art rejection under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 or 103, or 
for the purpose of clarifying the claim meaning under 35 U.S.C. § 112, the patentee is regarded 
as “having conceded an inability to claim the broader subject matter or at least as having 
abandoned his right to appeal a rejection.  In either case estoppel may apply.”8  The Supreme 
Court establishes amendment and appeal as opposite paths to be taken.  The Court views 
abandonment of the right to appeal, i.e. amending the claims, as a strong concession.  As a result 
of Festo, Applicants who amend claims without any explanation do so at their peril.  “[W]hen 
the court is unable to determine the purpose underlying a narrowing amendment – and hence a 
rationale for limiting the estoppel to the surrender of particular equivalents [under the doctrine 
of equivalents] – the court should presume that the patentee surrendered all subject matter 
between the broader and the narrower language.”9
{5} The Festo decision equates amendment with a surrender of the right to appeal, and 
demonstrates that a presumption of estoppel or surrender of equivalents arises from such 
amendment.  This suggests that if the rejection of a broad independent claim is appealed, 
rather than amended, estoppel may not apply.  Alternatively, a less stringent estoppel may apply 
even if the claim is ultimately deemed unpatentable on appeal because the Applicant has not 
acquiesced to the Examiner’s rejection.  In view of the  Supreme Court precedent, during ex parte 
practice, an Applicant who can make a colorable argument of patentability over prior art without 
amending the claims should proceed to make such arguments.  This approach should be taken 
even though amendatory material would strengthen the arguments.  Such an Applicant will 
neither be  presumed to have acquiesced in the rejection, nor to have surrendered a wide swath 
of equivalents between the original and amended claim.  As a safeguard, amendatory material 
can be placed in a separate dependent claim to test whether the amendatory material would be 
deemed to describe allowable subject matter.
{6} Aside from the issue of scope of equivalents addressed by the Supreme Court, the Federal 
Circuit case law on dedication also suggests that narrowing claim amendments are a form of 
conscious waiver. 
The patentee has control over the drafting of the claims, and if he discloses but 
omits to claim certain subject matter, he will be held to have waived the right 
to capture the disclosed matter under the doctrine of equivalents, and to have 
dedicated it to the public.  No such waiver occurs where, as in Graver Tank II, the 
patentee actually claimed the subject matter, even if the particular claims are later 
held invalid.  There is, moreover, in such circumstances far less possibility that the 
patentee is “gaming” the system, that is, deliberately writing narrow claims with the 
objective of avoiding a searching PTO examination and recapturing the disclosed 
subject matter through the doctrine of equivalents.10
In view of the negative consequences of a failure to argue patentability to the fullest extent, 
and recognizing the pitfalls of dedication if broad claims are amended to exclude particular 
embodiments, it behooves an Applicant to strenuously fight any patentability rejections without 
amendment, if possible.
III. EVALUATING WHETHER TO APPEAL A REJECTION
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{7} Over the course of ex parte prosecution, the Applicant should continually evaluate the strength 
of the Examiner’s rejection, considering not only the technical points underlying the rejection, 
but also the procedure applied in making the rejection and the rationale used to maintain any 
rejections.  This evaluation will result in a better-informed decision concerning whether an appeal 
should be pursued.
{8} In the event of a second non-final rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102, addressing novelty, or under 
35 U.S.C. § 103, addressing obviousness, it is beneficial to respond to either rejection under 37 
C.F.R. § 1.111.  In view of such non-finality, § 1.111 gives the Applicant the opportunity to obtain 
allowance of the claims in a timely manner without incurring the expense and time delays of an 
appeal.11  The most recent available figures from the U.S. Patent Office indicate that the Board 
of Patent Appeals is currently deciding appeals filed up to three years ago.12  The opportunity to 
respond again under § 1.111 also affords the opportunity to develop the record further, which 
leads to either of two possible benefits.  
{9} A first possible benefit is that the Examiner will accept the arguments in the response as being 
sufficiently persuasive to place at least some of the claims in condition for allowance.  At that 
juncture, the Applicant has the additional option of amending the claims to obtain allowance of 
some claims and filing a separate continuation application for any claims that remain rejected.  
{10} A second possible benefit is that the Examiner, even while rejecting the arguments 
in the response as unpersuasive, will helpfully expand upon the rationale as to the lack of 
persuasiveness in a subsequent non-final or final rejection.  The value of this second possibility 
necessarily relies on the nature of the response filed by the Applicant.  This fact makes it very 
important to exercise precision in formulating the response, rather than stating generalities.  
General denials submitted by the Applicant merely beget general denials from the Examiner, 
which is not helpful towards advancing a dialog with the Examiner, obtaining the patent or 
developing the record for appeal.  For these reasons, an Applicant should respond to a final 
rejection under 37 C.F.R. § 1.116 by using the same strategy.  In particular, for any response 
to arguments made by the Examiner, the Applicant should assess the underlying rationale and 
explain any weaknesses or inconsistencies in the Examiner’s position.
{11} Arguments directed towards patentability over prior art fall generally into two broad 
categories: technical and legal.  Both types of arguments should be developed in responses filed 
under 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.111 and 1.116 prior to entering the appeal stage.  
A. Analysis of Recent Decisions
{12} The decisions of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, dating from appeals filed 
during Fiscal Year 1993, are available through the U.S.P.T.O. website at http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/com/sol/foia/index.html.  The database is searchable, through somewhat limited 
search constraints, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/search.html.  A random sample of the 
decisions indicates that legal and technical arguments are equally effective in reversing Examiner 
rejections.13   
{13} A review of a number of recent Board Decisions reveals several analyses that are noteworthy. 
These particular decisions offer some insight into “claim construction” approaches that 
various panels have taken, comparing and contrasting effective arguments based on technical 
distinctions and legal arguments.  Most, if not all, of the decisions posted to the website, and all 
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of those discussed below, are identified as “nonprecedential” decisions that are not binding on the 
Board.  If any weight is given to such decisions, the weight is severely limited.14  However, in certain 
circumstances, the Federal Circuit, which reviews appeal decisions of the Board, will give some 
weight to decisions designated as nonprecedential.15   For purposes of fashioning or evaluating 
arguments for appeal, a brief discussion of selected decisions follows.  
 1. Claim Interpretation of Rejected Claims
{14} In analyzing prior art rejections, Board decisions that address claim interpretation rely upon 
two seemingly opposite lines of legal precedent.  Recent panels, following the mandate of the 
Supreme Court in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,16 resort to Applicant’s disclosure for 
purposes of interpreting the claims.17  This appears to be contrary to the concept that, during 
prosecution, the claims are to be given their broadest reasonable meaning, and that the scope of 
the claim cannot be narrowed by reading disclosed limitations into the claim.18  Several decisions 
of the Board do in fact resort to the specification and drawings for the purpose of understanding 
the scope of a rejected claim.  
{15} Even though the panels have turned to the specification to interpret claims on appeal, any 
Applicant deciding whether to pursue an appeal based on existing claim language, or whether to 
continue prosecution by one of several non-appeal alternatives discussed below, should consider 
whether its particular arguments can be supported by the context and broad concepts of the 
pending claim recitations.  In such a case, it is possible that the broad concepts of the claim can 
be argued on appeal without modifying the claim language to specifically include the limitations 
in the specification.  However, if the arguments must rely on actual limitations discussed in 
the specification but are unclaimed, then the Applicant is better advised to amend the claim to 
describe the invention more specifically.
 a. Conceptual Distinctions Based On Context
{16} In Ex parte Schmidt, the claim in question was recited as follows:
An extended field-of-view mirror, the mirror comprising: (a) a convex reflective 
surface having a viewing area and a continuous perimetral edge surrounding the 
viewing area: (b) an opaque band integrally formed with the reflective surface 
and depending therefrom, the opaque band substantially surrounding the entire 
reflective surface; and (c) a mounting flange integrally formed with the opaque band 
and extending outwardly therefrom.19 
{17} A central issue in the appeal was how to define the broad recitation “integrally formed with.”  
The Board recognized that the specification provided no definition of the term, but turned to figure 
four of the application to determine that, in the context of claim one, “integrally formed with” 
meant that the mirror parts were joined together prior to any use of the mirror.20  In essence, the 
mirror included each of the cited components prior to its being secured to a mounting frame.21  
In reversing the rejection, the Board noted that the cited art did not include the claim elements 
“integrally formed with,” since a separate elastic ring was part of the disclosed structure only after 
being put into an interlocking relationship with a frame.  The cited ring was thus “separate” and 
not integrally formed with the mirror prior to any use.22
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{18} The decision and definition of the phrase “integrally formed with” in Ex parte Schmidt 
appears to have put significant weight on the context established by the claim preamble.23  In 
particular, the item in question was “a mirror” that included several elements “integrally formed 
with” other elements.  It is conceivable that a different outcome would have resulted on appeal if 
the claim recited a “mirror assembly” rather than just a “mirror.”24
{19} The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences again resorted to the Applicant’s 
specification for claim construction purposes in Ex parte Rahman.25  While acknowledging that 
claims should be given their broadest reasonable interpretation during prosecution, the Board 
further indicated that the terms in the claim should be construed as those skilled in the art would 
construe the claim.26
{20} In Rahman, the claim in question recited: “A method for controlling traffic comprising: 
developing global positioning system information about a plurality of vehicles; analyzing traffic 
patterns based on said information; developing traffic control signals based on said traffic 
patterns; and transmitting said traffic control signals to traffic control devices.”27  Based on 
descriptions in the specification, the Board construed “traffic control devices” to comprise devices 
such as speed limit signs, traffic metering lights, traffic signs and traffic signals.28  However, the 
Board considered that the transmission of traffic information to a vehicle was not a transmission 
of traffic control signals to “a traffic control device” and rejected the claim.29
{21} Under its broadest construction, the term “traffic control device” may comprise any device 
that would have an impact on traffic.  It is not inconceivable that a controller in a vehicle would 
have some impact on traffic flows.  Yet, in reversing the rejection, the Board’s analysis appears to 
import definitional aspects of the term “a traffic control device” into the claims to limit the phrase 
to those listed in the specification.  Obviously, given the Federal Circuit’s directive in In re Morris 30 
and In re Hiniker Co.,31 which emphasizes the importance of claim language rather than resorting 
to the specifications, an Applicant cannot be assured that the Board will use the specification so 
liberally in the appeal of any given case.  However, the context of the claim recitation in Ex parte 
Rahman also suggests that “vehicles” recited in the first element of the appealed claim are being 
distinguished from “traffic control devices” recited in the last element.  Therefore, apart from 
the definitions imparted by the specification, the claims themselves would appear to warrant 
the construction afforded by the Board that a “traffic control device” is distinguishable from a 
“vehicle.”
 2. Patentability of Invention Based on Achieved Effects Over Prior Art
{22} In some decisions reviewed for the preparation of this article, the Board did not specifically 
rely on the definition of a claim term in deciding the case.  Rather, the rationale underlying 
reversals of the appealed rejections were cast in terms of the Applicant’s discovery and solution 
of a new problem. In Ex parte Nella, the rejected claim recited:
A target detection, seeking and guidance system for an air-to-air, air-to-ground and/
or ground-to-air missile comprising a hyperspectral imaging system for detecting 
a target having a predetermined hyperspectral signature; means for enabling the 
missile to track the target matching the predetermined hyperspectral signature; 
and means including a missile controller for guiding the flight path of the missile to 
intercept the flight path of the target matching said predetermined hyperspectral 
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signature.32
{23} The primary reference was directed generally towards missile guidance systems without 
specifically indicating that the targets were tracked by a hyperspectral signature.33  Three 
secondary references did teach hyperspectral imaging for scanning earthbound features such 
as mineral and vegetation deposits and for oceanographic and agricultural applications.  The 
Examiner had deemed such earth-bound targets as corresponding to the “targets” in the claims.34  
The claims themselves did not define what comprised “targets,” and in reversing the rejection, the 
panel also did not specifically define what comprised a “target.”  Rather, the panel determined 
that, reviewing the cited references, one skilled in the art would not have been motivated to 
combine the teachings in the manner proposed by the Examiner: 
First of all, there is no mention in any of the three secondary references of 
utilizing hyperspectral imaging for a missile firing system.  Cutts teaches utilizing 
hyperspectral imaging from a vehicle in space to scan the earth . . . for the 
purpose of identifying mineral or vegetative types. . . .  While the appellants have 
acknowledged that the system disclosed in Davies would be “suitable for use” 
in the claimed missile system . . . , the reference does not mention such use, 
suggesting only that the system be used in “earth monitoring satellites” . . .  such 
as oceanography, mapping and mineral exportation, for example. . . .  The only 
uses suggested in the Lurie reference are in space borne cameras that monitor 
environmental and agricultural situations. . . .  Second, the claims before us on 
appeal all require that the system detect, track and guide a missile based upon 
the “predetermined hyperspectral signature of a target of interest” which, as we 
understand the teachings of the applied references, is not the manner in which 
these systems operate.  Third, none of the applied references recognize the 
problems to which the appellants’ invention are directed, namely, providing a target 
tracking system for missiles that provides a high degree of recognition and is 
immune to countermeasures.35
The decision in Ex parte Nella has obvious benefits to the Applicant since it does not resort to any 
definition of what comprises a “target.”36
 
{24} As a second example, in Ex parte Abbott, the claim recited a structure for a corrosion 
resistant lead frame for an integrated circuit which included, inter alia, “an isolation layer 
disposed upon said base metal layer and having a second standard reduction potential, said 
second standard reduction potential being greater than said first standard reduction potential….”37 
{25} In the decision, the Board noted that the Applicant’s specification provided an example of 
the isolation layer as comprising of a palladium/nickel alloy layer.38  However, in reversing the 
rejection, the isolation layer was not specifically defined by reference to such materials.39  Rather, 
the panel stated more generally, “the problems to be solved and/or the solutions to the problems 
in the Levine patents are different from that of the present invention.”40  In addition, in reversing 
the prior art rejection, the decision further explains, 
Since [the cited art] is concerned with a different problem relative to the claimed 
invention and thus a different solution, we agree with the appellant that the 
combined teachings of the admitted prior art and Levine ‘067 cannot render the 
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subject matter of the appealed claims to be unpatentable within the meaning of 35 
U.S.C. § 103.41
{26} The case law is replete with several general concepts that permit Examiner’s to apply and 
combine references.  First, references need not be directed to the same problem as an invention 
in order to render a claim unpatentable.42  Second, the references themselves need not expressly 
teach each and every claim feature to provide motivation for a modification.43  Third, the intended 
use of a particular element does not confer patentability.44  Lastly, to comprise analogous art, 
a reference need not be pertinent to every problem with which the Applicant is involved.45  This 
case law liberates the Examiner to apply and combine prior art that may seem unrelated to the 
invention at hand.  The wide swath of available art and the rationale for combination of art limits 
the amount of ground that the Applicant can truly claim as new and unobvious.  Therefore, there 
appears to be a great legal hurdle against making a successful argument that the Applicant 
discovered a new problem and solution.  Nevertheless, if at all feasible, arguments on appeal 
should address the Applicant’s discovery of a solution to a new problem, since the benefits are so 
numerous.  The primary benefit is that the claim may be passed to issuance without the Board 
making any pronouncements in the file history on the definition of any claim term.  In addition, 
there will be a pronouncement in the file history that the Applicant was the first to identify a 
problem and solution.  This is a strong factual component that would favor conferring “pioneer” 
status on the patent and a greater scope of equivalents.46  
{27} As a corollary, while the above two examples in Nella and Abbott pertain to an effect 
achieved by the invention over the cited art, it is important to note that the effect is actually 
described by the claim language.  In Nella, the claim actually described guiding a missile 
according to a “flight path” of the target.47  Therefore, the conceptual difference between the 
claimed “target” and the earthbound targets in the references was fairly recited in the claims.  
Similarly, in Abbot, the relative “standard reduction potential” of the isolation layer was also 
described by the claims themselves, such that conceptually the claims were distinguishable 
over the prior art.48  In contrast to the above examples, panels also consistently affirm rejections 
where the Applicant argued that the invention achieved a particular effect over the prior art.  
However, in those cases where the rejection was affirmed, the claims were silent as to the 
purported improved effect.49 
 3.  Semantic Distinctions Based On Definitions
{28} Additionally, following the widespread use of dictionaries in claim construction exercises 
by the Federal Circuit,50 the Board of Patent Appeals also turns to dictionary definitions in 
determining whether rejections are sustainable.  In Ex parte Abe, 1997-2212, the claim included 
a “second step for decompiling the machine program, thereby producing a second high-level 
language source program which does not depend on any architecture.…”  The panel recognized 
that neither the specification nor the file history defined the term “decompiling” but instead 
relied upon a technical dictionary to ascertain the scope of the claim.  In so doing, the Board 
determined that the cited art did not include a step for decompiling, which was independent of 
a particular architecture, but in fact provided an opposite step of recompiling a program into an 
architecture dependent form.  Accordingly, the Board reversed the pending rejections.51
{29} In similar manner, in Ex parte Goumaz the panel referred to a technical dictionary to 
determine the meaning of the claim term “charge amplifier.”52  There, the Board determined 
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that amplification required a component to increase the strength of a signal without appreciably 
altering its characteristic waveform.  During ex parte prosecution, the Examiner had continually 
relied upon a storage capacitor as corresponding to the claimed charge amplifier.  The Board 
noted that the passive capacitor cited by the Examiner could not correspond to the claimed 
amplifier.53   
{30} Of course, the Board’s use of dictionaries can also have the opposite effect and lead the 
panel to affirm a rejection.  In Ex parte Aboaf, a claim recited a type of recording head, and 
the outcome of the appeal turned on the proper construction of the term “modules” appearing 
in the claim.  The panel determined that “module” is a broad and non-specific term, generally 
defined with respect to electronic apparatus as a “packaged functional assembly of electronic 
components for use with other such assemblies.”54  The panel noted that the specification 
referred to a particular arrangement of read and write heads to make up “modules” but that the 
claims were not so limited.  The non-specificity of the term “module” was also used throughout 
the cited art to identify different groupings of elements, other than those specifically identified by 
the Applicant.  Therefore, the rejection was affirmed in part because no distinction could be made 
based on the general term “module.”55  
{31} In the decisions discussed above, the Examiner seasonably challenged any construction 
argued by the Applicant during the course of prosecution.  In an instance where the Examiner 
offers no construction broader than that offered by the Applicant, this should be pointed out in 
the Appeal Brief.56  In the Abdelmonem appeal, the panel acknowledged that the claim recitation 
at issue was very broad and subject to varying interpretations.57  However, the Examiner never 
indicated that the claim step was being interpreted in making the rejections in a different way 
from that set forth by the Applicant.  Therefore, the Applicant’s interpretation prevailed, without 
the panel relying on embodiments in the specification for claim interpretation purposes.58  
{32} A final note on the use of dictionaries during appeal proceedings: the Board has been known 
to use a dictionary to define a term used in a cited reference to determine whether an appealed 
claim reads on the applied art.59  
{33} In view of the foregoing, an Applicant who relies on the definitional aspects of certain 
claim terms as a basis for distinguishing rejected claims from cited art would be well advised 
to consider (1) whether the Examiner has considered a broader definitional construction that 
is supportable; (2) whether the context of the claim recitation supports the advocated reading; 
(3) whether the plain meaning in either a common dictionary or a technical dictionary results 
in a broader construction that would make the rejected claim readable on the applied art; and 
(4) whether a term used in a cited reference, while different from the Applicant’s terminology, 
nonetheless can be construed to have the same meaning under either a common or a technical 
dictionary definition.
 4.  Claim Interpretation for Section 112 Rejections
{34} In decisions rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112, various panels have relied on the 
specification provision of the second paragraph60 to determine whether the Applicant has claimed 
the invention with sufficient clarity.61  Federal Circuit precedent clearly directs that construction 
of the claim for purposes of clarity is charged to the examination process.  “An essential purpose 
of patent examination is to fashion claims that are precise, clear, correct and unambiguous.  
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Only in this way can uncertainties of claim scope be removed, as much as possible, during the 
administrative process.”62  Under § 112, second paragraph, the test for indefiniteness is “whether 
the claim language, when read by a person of ordinary skill in the art in light of the specification, 
describes the subject matter with sufficient precision that the bounds of the claimed subject 
matter are distinct.”63 
{35} Despite the liberal use of the specification provision in determining claim precision, many 
rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, are affirmed.  In the Ohira and Babel appeal 
decisions, the panel had to determine whether the modifiers “substantial” and “substantially” 
rendered the claims indefinite.  In each instance, the panel determined that the claims were 
indeed indefinite for including these modifiers.64  The result is somewhat surprising because the 
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) expressly permits latitude in the use of relative 
terminology in claim language, including the use of the term “substantially.”65  It is noted that 
both in Ohira and in Babel, the panel found that the specifications gave no particular definition 
of what comprised a “substantial” amount of the characteristic in question.66  Therefore, unlike 
the cases discussed in the MPEP, the specifications did little to inform one skilled in the art of the 
precise nature of the claim scope.
{36} As an additional claim construction exercise for purposes of § 112, second paragraph, the 
Board may also consider whether the terminology in question has a particular meaning to one 
skilled in the art by examining prior art references.  In Ex parte Takaku, the Appellant presented 
prior art not relied upon by the Examiner to demonstrate that the physical characteristics of 
transparency would be understood by one skilled in the art of chemical vapor deposition.67 
 5.  Legal Arguments
{37} The above discussions relate primarily to technical assessments based on the teachings of 
the prior art in comparison with appealed claims.  The second major category of argument is 
the legal argument.  Legal arguments redirect the emphasis towards the Examiner’s improper 
application of references as set forth in the MPEP §§ 2112 and 2141-2144.  Focusing a response 
and appeal on the weaknesses in the Examiner’s rationale, rather than on the actual technical 
teachings, forces the Examiner to reveal more of his thought processes.  This will help the 
Applicant understand the Examiner’s arguments, identify the weaknesses of their claims, and 
shore up any such weaknesses prior to appeal.  Focusing on the Examiner’s rationale during 
ex parte prosecution also has the benefit of avoiding the inadvertent limiting of claims based 
on express representation of what the claimed invention “is” and “is not” in comparison to the 
applied art.  This reduces the impact of file history estoppel in the case.  
 a. Lack of Inherency in Cited Art
{38} A review of sample cases suggests that contemporary panels are not inclined to rely on 
purported implicit teachings in a reference to affirm a rejection.  The hesitancy to find inherent 
disclosures in prior art references applies to both (1) claimed structural features and (2) claimed 
resultant effects.  The structural features include, for example, attributes of shape of a particular 
element,68 the ratios of dimensions for deciding placement of claim elements,69 the carbon 
bonding in a chemical structure,70 and the presence of close-boiling of non-aromatics.71 
Claimed effects include whether a rubber material is suitable for use as an “eraser,”72 whether a 
component is operable in a “push on, pull off” fashion,73 and whether a hanger is rotatable about 
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a post.74
{39} It is noteworthy that the cases that reverse rejections based on inherency appear generally 
to be of more recent vintage.  The concept of the lack of inherency argument is not a new one.75 
However, the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Robertson appears to have given new strength to 
this legal argument.76  To establish inherency, the extrinsic evidence
[M]ust make clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the 
thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons 
of ordinary skill. . . .  Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities 
or possibilities.  The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of 
circumstances is not sufficient.77
In view of the prevalence of reversals of rejections on grounds of lack of inherency of claim 
elements in applied art, the record should be carefully developed with regard to any viable 
inherency positions.
 b. Motivation to Combine
{41} The argument for teaching away from particular combinations of references has proven 
to be a common basis for reversing rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103.78  In Ex parte A. Said el 
Shami, the claim for a diagnostic device for biological samples recited, in relevant part, “a specific 
antibody binder covalently immobilized on said first solid phase support to which an analyte label 
is prereacted to saturate substantially all binding sites on said binder to form a first solid phase 
specific antibody binderanalyte label complex . . . .”79  The Board noted that the cited art was not 
drawn to antibody-analyte complexes and to the extent that any analogies could be drawn, it was 
clear that the target DNA in the reference did not become saturated as claimed.80 The saturation 
of all the binding states in the disclosed probe would disable the DNA hybridization, which was 
the desired result in the reference.  An additional secondary reference also included a similar 
deficiency since saturation of the binding sites would cause the binding sites to become occupied 
when the reference relied on site availability for the disclosed device to operate.81  It is not obvious 
that modifying a prior art device would lead to an inoperative construction.82 
{42} The Examiner’s motivation for combining references can also be undermined by focusing on 
the effects of the cited art.  In Ex parte Palulu, the Examiner contended that the positioning of 
certain operating switches onto the steering wheel of the vehicle would obviously minimize driver 
distraction from the road.83  However, the cited reference was operable only when the vehicle is 
at a stop, in an idling state or in a park position.  Accordingly, there is no concern for the driver’s 
distraction as the Examiner had postulated.  The Panel subsequently reversed the rejection.84 
{43} Strongly contesting the propriety of combining references either under the principle that the 
references teach away from their combination, or that the modification or combination would 
render one reference inoperable for its intended purpose is valuable since, as discussed above, 
it would focus the analysis away from particular definitions in the claim language.  Moreover, in 
the event that it appears that the combination of art does conceptually teach each feature of the 
claim, then lack of motivation remains an option to traverse the rejection.  
IV. OPTIONS TO PURSUE IF APPEAL IS NOT PURSUED
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{44} As a general rule, ex parte prosecution should be exhausted up through receipt of the 
Advisory Action after the Applicant responds to a final rejection.  A constructive dialog between 
the Applicant and the Examiner may lead to an earlier issuance of the patent, while providing 
rigorous examination of the application. The latter has the benefit of bolstering the strength of the 
patent upon issuance.
{45} If after a final rejection, the Applicant receives an Advisory Action indicating that the 
arguments of record have not been deemed persuasive for all of the claims, the Applicant still 
has several non-appeal options.  A notice of appeal may be filed for reasons other than seeking 
review of a rejection by the Board.  For example, because filing a Notice of Appeal automatically 
provides a two-month period for filing the brief, many Applicants routinely file a notice of appeal 
as a cheaper alternative to seeking a third month extension of time to respond to a final rejection 
under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). 85  Under these circumstances, and with the consent of the Examiner, 
prosecution may proceed after filing a notice of appeal.
A.  Amendment of Claims
{46} Under 37 C.F.R. § 1.116, final rejection amendments that cancel claims complying with any 
requirement of form may be made of right, and amendments for rejected claims to place claims 
in better form for consideration on appeal may be admitted at the discretion of the Examiner.86 
B.  Amendment To Obtain Allowance Of Claims Coupled With Continuation For Rejected Claims
{47} In the case that some claims stand rejected and some claims are allowable, a recommended 
course would be to amend the allowable subject matter into condition for allowance in the subject 
application.  To avoid or mitigate the effects of estoppel, the Applicant may file a continuation 
application for the rejected subject matter.  The decision in Haynes International, Inc. v. Jessop 
Steel Co.87 demonstrates the benefits of pursuing cancelled subject matter in a continuation case. 
In Haynes, the Applicant was successful in obtaining reversal of rejections of certain claims in a 
parent application during appeal but unsuccessful in reversing the rejection of another claim, and 
therefore rewrote subject matter to obtain allowance of the allowed claims.88  The Board canceled 
the rejected claim from the parent case.89  The Applicant indicated that they could conceivably 
garner additional technical evidence in support of the patentability of the rejected claim and 
subsequently filed a continuation application.90  However, the Applicant did not refile the rejected 
claim that was previously before the Board and further did not submit any new evidence for 
patentability in the continuation.91
[C]ancellation of these claims [in the parent] did not conclusively establish 
that Cabot wanted to relinquish coverage of the subject matter encompassed 
by them, and thus did not necessarily create an estoppel.  It is only when the 
cancellation is considered along with [Applicant’s] failure to refile these claims and 
submit additional test data to support them, can it be said that an estoppel was 
conclusively established.92
{48} Haynes suggests that a different case would be presented had the cancellation of rejected 
claims occurred while prosecution was on-going.  Had that been the case, the Applicant’s purpose 
in canceling the claims could be  inferred from that act as a relinquishment of subject matter.  
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Haynes also creates a negative inference in not pursuing cancelled subject matter from a parent 
case in a continuation.
C. Amendment of Non-Allowed Claims
{49} The Examiner has discretion to enter an amendment placing a case in condition for 
allowance at any time prior to forwarding the Examiner’s answer on appeal. However, unless 
the amendment requires only a cursory review by the Examiner, the appellant ordinarily will be 
expected to comply with 37 C.F.R. § 1.116(c), by showing “good and sufficient reasons why they 
are necessary and were not earlier presented.”93
{50} As a practical matter, the Examiner will probably refuse entry of any claim amendment 
that was not deemed to place the entire application in condition for allowance.  However, if the 
Applicant determines that an amendment may persuade the Examiner of patentability, then 
submission of the amendment would not prejudice the Applicant’s position during the course of 
appeal.  Non-entered claim amendments will not be interpreted by the Board as an indication 
that an Applicant is acquiescing in a rejection.  An Applicant is not estopped from changing his 
strategy during the course of good faith prosecution before the Examiner.  A willingness to amend 
the claims does not prevent appellants from challenging a rejection.
D.  Submission of Additional Evidence
{51} The decision whether to admit additional evidence submitted after final rejection is within the 
discretion of the Examiner, unless prosecution is continued under one of the provisions discussed 
in Section E, below.  Unless the additional evidence is submitted in response to a suggestion from 
the Examiner, or is submitted in conjunction with a convincing argument presented in response 
to the final rejection and clearly places the application in condition for allowance, the Examiner 
is likely to conclude that the new evidence or argument for patentability introduces new issues or 
requires further substantive consideration, and will not enter the new evidence.94
E.  Continued Prosecution in Lieu of Appeal
1. Request For Continued Examination After Final Rejection: RCE
{52} For applications filed after June 8, 1995, the Applicant may request further prosecution 
on the merits and entry of any un-entered amendments filed under 37 C.F.R. § 1.116.95  Such a 
filing withdraws the finality of the Office Action and any submissions will be considered on the 
merits.  In addition to modifications to the specification and claims, with the filing of the RCE the 
prosecution can include submission of affidavit evidence and IDS materials.96  The submission 
may be made after the appeal process commences but must be made prior to a decision on 
appeal.  In this circumstance, the application will be treated as being withdrawn from appeal for 
prosecution before the Examiner.97  
 2.  Continuation Practice
{53} For any application, the Applicant may also file a continuation or continuation-in-part 
application to define the invention and claims more particularly.98  
 3.  Transitional Practice
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{54} For older cases that have been pending for at least two years as of June 8, 1995, the 
application is subject to the transitional provisions of 37 C.F.R. § 1.129(a). 99  Upon payment of 
the fee under 37 C.F.R. § 1.17(r) the Applicant or appellant is entitled to consideration of the new 
amendment, evidence, or submission denied entry by the Examiner after final rejection.  This 
submission must be made prior to filing a Brief on Appeal.  It is most important to appreciate that 
by filing an appeal brief under the GATT amendments, an appellant waives the right to continued 
examination of claims finally rejected in the same application under 37 C.F.R. § 1.129(a).  Filing 
an appeal brief therefore terminates the right to a seventeen-year term in an older application, if 
it is necessary to file a regular continuing application after the appeal.  Any such application will 
be restricted to a term that expires twenty years from the date of filing the first national benefit 
application.
V. CONCLUSION
{55} Even though the patent statute permits appeal prior to final rejection of the claims, an 
Applicant should take the opportunity to develop discourse with the Examiner to develop 
arguments and a more detailed understanding of the Examiner’s rationale.  Successful 
prosecution before the Examiner will likely lead to earlier issuance of the patent because the 
lengthy appeal process can be avoided.  Throughout ex parte prosecution, the Applicant should 
continually evaluate and strengthen his position in terms of technical arguments based on both 
concepts and semantics in addition to legal arguments.  If it is determined that the claims are not 
in the best possible condition for appeal, several options are available to continue prosecution 
before the Examiner.
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
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